Rare-earth minerals are essential to the modern world, powering everything from smartphones and electric vehicles to defence systems and renewable energy technologies. Yet, as the global demand for these materials surges, so too does the risk of relying heavily on a single supplier. Today, China holds a dominant position in rare-earth mining and refining, leaving much of the world vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and geopolitical leverage.

What makes these minerals so difficult to replace, how has the West responded to this strategic dependency, and could recent research from the University of Minnesota mark the beginning of a post-rare-earth era?

The challenges with rare-earth minerals and China

China has long been a major supplier of rare-earth minerals for all industries across the planet, and while this has been massively beneficial, as our dependencies have grown, it is beginning to show a number of issues. 

First, China controls the vast majority of global rare-earth mining and refining capacity, often estimated at around 70–80% of production and nearly all refining. These materials, such as neodymium, dysprosium, and terbium, are essential for high-performance electronics, electric motors, renewable energy systems, and advanced defence technologies. Because Western nations allowed their own rare-earth industries to decline over the past few decades, they now depend almost entirely on Chinese exports for these critical components.

Now initially, this dependence was not seen as a major risk, as Western manufacturers viewed China as a reliable and cost-effective supplier, benefiting from its abundant resources and lower production costs. However, as geopolitical tensions have grown (particularly surrounding trade, technology, and military competition), this reliance has become a strategic vulnerability. China has previously demonstrated a willingness to restrict exports of rare-earth materials for political reasons, as seen in past disputes with Japan. Such actions have now made Western governments acutely aware of how easily supply chains could be (and sometimes are) disrupted.

But the deeper issue lies in how integral these materials are to modern technology. From smartphones and EV motors to missile guidance systems and wind turbines, rare earths are not easily replaced or substituted. If China were to restrict exports or significantly raise prices, Western industries could face production halts, price shocks, and technological stagnation.

To counter this risk, the West is now racing to diversify supply chains, such as investing in rare-earth mining projects in other countries (e.g. Australia, Canada, and the United States), and developing recycling programs and alternative materials. However, rebuilding these capabilities will take years, given the complexity and environmental challenges of rare-earth processing.

Researcher creates rare-earth-free magnet

At the University of Minnesota, researcher Jian-Ping Wang and his team have developed a rare-earth-free permanent magnet based on iron-nitride, a breakthrough that challenges long-held assumptions in materials science. The research centres on a specific compound, Fe₁₆N₂, known for its unusually high magnetic saturation. While this material was first identified decades ago, previous attempts to produce it in stable, bulk form failed due to its structural fragility and difficulty in maintaining its magnetic properties at scale. 

Research from the University of Minnesota highlights that interest in alternative permanent magnets has grown due to increasing concerns around supply chain resilience and the environmental footprint of extraction. According to the institution, the global market for rare-earth magnets continues to expand, yet the associated mining and refining practices remain resource-intensive, prompting demand for alternatives that reduce environmental burden while improving material sustainability.

Wang’s team solved this by developing a controlled synthesis process that allows precise nitrogen incorporation into the iron lattice, stabilising the compound and preserving its strong magnetic characteristics. This achievement required not only new deposition techniques but also a deeper understanding of how atomic-scale defects influence magnetic behaviour.

Environmental Considerations in Iron–Nitride Magnet Development

Insights from the University of Minnesota’s materials programme notes that iron-nitride systems may provide a pathway toward reducing the reliance on rare-earth mining, which is often associated with chemical waste and long-term ecological impacts. Their work indicates that achieving stable magnetic performance through controlled nitrogen incorporation could support industries seeking lower-impact manufacturing inputs without compromising functional requirements.

The result is a material with a magnetic field strength surpassing that of some conventional rare-earth-based magnets, combined with excellent thermal stability. These properties make it suitable for demanding environments, including electric vehicle motors and high-speed generators, where temperature resilience and consistent performance are critical. The magnets also exhibit predictable behaviour during repeated magnetisation cycles, an essential factor for long-term reliability.

The University of Minnesota’s findings also point to the potential for iron-nitride magnets to support wider electrification goals. The research team note that high-performance, rare-earth-free magnets could contribute to reducing material volatility in electric mobility supply chains, which remain sensitive to geopolitical shifts and fluctuating rare-earth prices. This positions the technology as a possible stabilising factor as electrified transport scales further.

Pathways to Commercial Adoption and Electrification Impact

To transition from laboratory work to industrial application, Wang co-founded Niron Magnetics, a startup dedicated to refining the manufacturing process. The company employs scalable methods that use existing industrial equipment rather than specialised rare-earth processing systems. Their approach involves forming thin iron-nitride films, then assembling them into composite structures optimised for different applications. Early prototypes have demonstrated high efficiency, paving the way for future commercial production.

The University of Minnesota notes that the long-term interest in iron-nitride stems partly from its potential to provide stable magnetic strength without relying on complex overseas extraction routes. The institution highlights that rare-earth-free approaches may support a more balanced global supply structure, reducing exposure to single-source dependencies and encouraging regionalised manufacturing strategies.

Statements from the University of Minnesota outline how commercialisation efforts aim to address long-standing industry hesitations about alternatives to neodymium-based magnets. Their referenced startup framework demonstrates that scalable iron-nitride manufacturing may align with existing industrial workflows, reducing adoption barriers for sectors such as motor design, clean energy hardware and grid-scale systems. The university emphasises that this approach is intended to support both performance requirements and long-term sustainability objectives.

Further commentary from the university suggests that the rising demand for electric motors, wind turbines and robotics has intensified the search for magnet technologies that avoid rare-earth bottlenecks. Their research indicates that iron-nitride developments may contribute to a broader set of engineering options for manufacturers seeking stable pricing, predictable sourcing and reduced environmental impact, particularly as sustainability expectations continue to shape procurement decisions.

How could this technology affect China’s position?

If Jian-Ping Wang’s iron-nitride magnet technology proves commercially viable, it could significantly weaken China’s dominant position in the global rare-earth market. For decades, China’s control of rare-earth mining and refining has served as a powerful economic and political tool, giving it leverage over industries that depend on neodymium, dysprosium, and similar materials. A functional replacement for these elements would undermine that leverage almost overnight.

The most immediate effect of such a technology would be economic, as rare-earth minerals would lose much of their value through reduced demand. While they would still be used in some specialised applications, the massive consumption driven by magnet production would fall sharply. This reduction in demand would hurt Chinese exporters and the extensive industrial network that supports the country’s rare-earth industry.

Western manufacturers would also gain significant flexibility, especially in supply chains and sourcing. Without dependence on China, companies could diversify their sourcing strategies and negotiate from a much stronger position. This would make it far more difficult for China to apply pressure through export restrictions or pricing controls. Other countries may even begin investing in smaller-scale mining operations for the remaining materials still required, as the global dependence on rare-earth would no longer justify large monopolised supply systems.

However, the strategic consequences would extend beyond economics for China. The country’s current advantage in critical materials gives it a measure of protection against Western sanctions and trade limitations. But should that advantage erode, its technological influence and bargaining power could weaken, isolating it further in international markets already strained by semiconductor and energy disputes.

Going into the far future, the emergence of rare-earth-free magnets could potentially deepen existing tensions between the West and China. A reduced ability to exert economic leverage might push China toward more protectionist or confrontational policies, accelerating the broader technological and political divide between East and West. Thus, what began as a scientific breakthrough in materials research could, in time, become another defining fault line in global industrial competition.